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TEN YEARS OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
IN COLORADO-i 940-1950*
BENJAMIN S. GALLAND
Professor of Law, Univcrsity of Colorado School of Lw
"At the foundation of Domestic Relations lies the institution
of marriage," states Professor Peck.' We will use his statement
as our excuse for starting with this topic. By statute,2 in 1945,
the Colorado legislature prohibited and declared to be void all
marriages wherein one or both of the parties was under the age
of sixteen years unless, prior to the contracting thereof, a judge
of a court of record of the state shall have approved said marriage
and authorized the issuance of a license therefor. This act has as
yet not been construed.
It is also provided in the Colorado statutes that marriages,
wherein either party is under the age of eighteen years, are de-
clared voidable,3 and actions for annulment may be maintained
upon this ground, "provided the action is commenced before the
party reaches the age of nineteen years." 4
Another section 5 declares certain consanguinous and certain
miscegenetic marriages to be absolutely void. Is there any differ-
ence between a marriage absolutely void as in the last mentioned
statute, and a marriage declared to be "void" as in the 1945 stat-
ute? 6 The word void in other statutes has not always been given
its dictionary absoluteness, but is frequently construed as mean-
ing voidable.
7
That courts seem sympathetic in marriage situations and en-
deavor to protect an unfortunate female in distress by declaring
a valid marriage to exist in doubtful cases, is indicated in two
late opinions. In Moffat Coal Co. v. The Industrial Commission,8
a woman was, by virtue of a common-law marriage, held to be
the widow of one Pete Todd, killed in an industrial accident. Thus
*,This paper was prepared by Mr. Galland as part of the basic research for the
Ten Year Review of Colorado Law presented at the 52nd annual meeting of the Colo-
rado Bar Association in Colorado Springs, October 12-14, 1950. Since Conflicts of Laws
and the Rules of Civil Procedure were covered in other sections of the review, domestic
relations problems relating thereto are not included in this article.
I PECK, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 3d ed. (1930), p. 129.
2
COLO. LAWS, C. 177, p. 478 (1945) ; COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 107, §(3)1 (1935).
S "All marriages wherein either party is under the age of eighteen years are hereby
declared to be voidable." COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 56, §33 (1935).
4 COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 55, §34 (1935). In Payne v. Payne, 214 P. 2d 495 (1950),
this section and that in the preceding note were held not applicable to a Texas marriage
between residents of Colorado, one of whom was seventeen years old. By the law of
Texas the marriage was valid, not voidable.
aCOLO. STAT. ANN., c. 107, § 2 (1935).
.TIFFANY, DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 3d ed. 1921). At page 25 of this work is the
the following statement: "As will be seen . . . statutes raising the age of consent,
though they may declare a marriage under the age of consent to be void, are construed
to'be voidable, and leave the effect of the marriage as at common law."
7See City and County of Denver v. Jones, 85 Colo. 212, 224 P. 924 (1929). See
also Colorado Annotations ALI, Restatement of Contracts, sec. 178. The common law
note that the marriage of an insane person is absolutely void, was recognized as law
in Cox v. Armstrong, Colo. Bar Ass'n, Advance Sheet, July 29, 1950, p. 363.
8 108 Colo. 388, 118 P. 2d 769 (1941) ; See parallel case Clayton Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 93 Colo. 145, 25 P. 2d 170 (1933).
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she was able to claim benefits under the Workmen's Compensation
Act. Her testimony showed that they lived together, had two
children, that they contemplated a future ceremonial marriage,
that "he kept putting it off and he never did," and that she did
not believe she was married, "because I wasn't." The decision
emphasized the fact that she was uneducated, and her testimony
was not, in words, used "with discriminating care." There was
good evidence of habit and repute.
In a second case 9 a woman had a living husband, one Mason,
when she began living with Reed. Four years later Mason di-
vorced her. She lived eight years, thereafter, with Reed in habit,
repute, and mutual recognition as husband and wife. The woman
was held to be a widow entitled to claim as widow under the Com-
pensation Act. "If there ever was a case where a relationship
unlawful in its inception could be matured into a common-law
marriage . . . this is that case." Continued cohabitation "after
the removal "I of the obstacle to marriage" under the circum-
stances raised a presumption of marriage."
In a case 12 of first impression, the Colorado statute,13 making
absolutely void all marriages between Negroes or mulattoes of
either sex and white persons, was held valid as against the objec-
tion that such statute was discriminatory against Negroes, and
denied defendants equal protection of the law. The case arose
out of a conviction for vagrancy under a Denver ordinance which
included in one of its definitions of the word vagrant, "any person
who shall lead an ... immoral ... course of life." The defendants
were living together claiming to be man and wife by virtue of a
common law marriage. The Supreme Court upheld the defend-
ants' conviction under the ordinance, holding the parties could
not be married either ceremonially or by common law 14 because of
the statute. The court refused to discuss the effect or any uncer-
tainty which might prevail as to the definition of a mulatto in
view of defendants' admission that one was a Negro and one a
white. Judicial notice was taken by the court that Denver was
not within that part of the state acquired from Mexico, wherein
the statute might not be applicable. 15
'Rocky Mt. Fuel Co. v. Reed, 110 Colo. 88, 130 P. 2d 1049 (1941).
10 i.e. Mason's divorce.
. Cases wherein a relation was meretricious in its inception, there being an im-
pediment to the marriage relation and the parties continued to live together as
husband and wife after the removal of the impediment, have caused courts much diffi-
culty. The Colorado case may be contra to the weight of authority. 55 C.J.S. 882-883.
But there is high authority to support the Colorado decision. See Campbell v. Campbell
(The Breadalane Case), L.R. 1 H.L. Sc. 182 (1867). See discussion, MADDEN DOMESTIC
RELATIONS, (1931) pp. 73-75 ; PECK on DOMESTIc RELATIONS, 3rd ed., p. 145 (1930).
12Jackson v. City and County of Denver, 109 Colo. 196, 124 P. 2d 240 (1942).
"3 Supra, note 5.
14 109 Colo. 196, 199.
1"Justice Bouck dissented. Recent cases in the United States Supreme Court,
Sweatt v. Painter, 70 S. Ct. 848 (1950), and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 70
S. Ct. 851 (1950), are of interest in connection with the problem involved In the Jack-
son case. See also, C. D. STOKES, THE SERBIAN BOG OF MISCEGENATION, 21 ROCKY MT.
L. Rgv. 425 (1949). A recent California case held contra to the Colorado case, Perez




A wife was convicted of murder in the second degree. In a
divorce action against her husband, on motion of said wife, the
trial court ordered the defendant to pay into the registry of the
court $300 as the docket fee in the criminal case and for a tran-
script of record to review such conviction in the Supreme Court.
The order was affirmed by the latter court.'" Costs, attorneys fees,
and incidental expenses incurred by a wife in the defense of a
criminal case, and a review of the judgment therein were held
necessaries for which a husband is liable, the wife being destitute.' 7
In Vetting v. Kefover,18 a widower, who paid the medical bills
and funeral expenses of his deceased wife, was held entitled to
recover the same through a claim filed against her estate. The
wife had made no provision for funeral expenses in her will. The
problem was whether the husband or the wife's estate was primarily
liable for such debts. This was a case of first impression in Colo-
rado.' 9
In Wigehert v. Lockhart,:" Wigchert was arrested in Colorado
in obedience to a warrant issued by the governor of Colorado in
compliance with a requisition of the governor of California. He
was charged with being a fugitive from justice. The crime charged
was failure to support his minor children. Wigchert petitioned
for release under writ of habeas corpus. The finding was against
him in the trial court. The Supreme Court reversed the holding,
and ordered Wigchert released, holding that to be a fugitive from
justice, one must have been physically present within the demand-
ing state at the time of the commission of the crime charged. It
is not enough that he was only constructively within its borders.
"Failure to support a wife or child, while the husband or father
is in another state, is no ground for extradition." The determina-
tion of the governor that petitioner is a fugitive from justice was
held not conclusive.
Compare this case with the case of Marsolais v. DeAngelis.2'
In the latter case, petitioner was convicted of nonsupport of wife
and children in Massachusetts, and had violated the terms of a
probation order in that state. He left immediately thereafter with-
out permission of the probation officer. He was held extraditable
in the absence of a showing that the terms of the probation had
been complied with or that no terms of the probation had been
broken.
11Read v. Read, 119 Colo. 278, 202 P. 2d 953 (1949).
"Case noted, 21 ROCKY MT. L. REV. 439" (1949).
18112 Colo. 53, 145 P. 2d 879 (1944). At common law, a wife's funeral expenses
were the primary obligation of the husband, MADDEN, OP. cit. supra note 11, pp. 198-
200. Undoubtedly medical expenses were necessaries for which husband was primarily
liable at common law. Id. 196.
,9 112 Colo. p. 55.
"114 Colo. 485, 166 P. 2d 988 (1946).
21215 P. 2d 315 (1950).
DICTA
ANTENUPTIAL AND POSTNUPTIAL AGREEMENTS
Husband and wife may make antenuptial 22 or postnuptial 23
agreements inter se barring either from inheriting under the in-
testacy 24 law of Colorado. Such marriage settlements may be
adequate to bar all claims 25 by the survivor in the real and per-
sonal estate of the other at death. The widow's allowance is not
waived by such property settlement unless in terms that do not
admit of a doubt and that clearly and definitely indicate a purpose
to waive this specific statutory right.26 In a late case,27 an ante-
nuptial agreement, in terms barring further claims of the wife
to the husband's property or estate, still left the husband free to
convey or devise to the wife, property over and above what was
necessary to secure the property settlement, and she was free to
accept such as a gift or devise as against his heirs at law.
A situation in which payments to the wife were held con-
tractual and not alimony was involved in International Trust Co.
v. Liebhardt,28 wherein, a separation agreement between the
spouses provided monthly payments of $450 to the wife until her
death or remarriage. Such agreement was by its terms binding
on his heirs, executors, and administrators. The agreement, as
was specified should be done in case of divorce, was incorporated
into a later divorce decree. At the husband's death his executor
claimed that liability to make further payments ceased or was
subject to modification. It was held that the payments were not,
by such incorporation in the decree, made alimony.2 9 No Colorado
case, it was stated in the opinion, definitely holds, "that a court
has power to grant alimony for a period beyond the life of the
husband." Nor were the payments subject to modification by the
divorce court for changed circumstances as in the case with ali-
mony.30 The decreed liability for such payments was based on
contract. Colorado courts have, by statute,31 jurisdiction to en-
force marriage settlement contracts and separate maintenance
agreements whether the parties have been divorced or not.
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE
One case, in its different phases, appeared in the Colorado
Supreme Court on four occasions. The plaintiff therein sought
annulment on the ground that the defendant wife had, at the time
0 Griffee v. Griffee, 108 Colo. 366, 117 P. 2d 823 (1941).
13McCutcheon v. Jordan, 112 Colo. 499, 150 P. 2d 859 (1944).
24 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 176, §1 (1935).
Is In such case it h'as been held the widow may not breach the contract and claim
one-half of the husband's estate against his will. Remington v. Remington, 69 Colo.
206, 193 P. 550 (1920).
2 Bradley v. Bradley, 106 Colo. 500, 106 P. 2d 1063 (1940); Griffee v. Griffee,
aupra note 22; McLaughlin v. Craig, 117 Colo. 67, 184 P. 2d 130 (1947). Note, 13
ROCKY MT. L. REV. 260 (1941).
27 Bartle v. Bartle, 216 P. 2d 649 (1950).
IsInternational Trust Co. Ex'r. v. Liebhardt, 111 Colo. 208, 139 P 2d 264, 147
A.L.R. 700 (1943).
1Ibid, 111 Colo. 208, 218.
30 International Trust Co. v. Liebhardt, supra, note 28, pp. 216, 217. See also Harris
v. Harris, 113 Colo. 41, 154 P. 2d 617 (1944).
a COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 56, §29 (1935).
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of their purported marriage, another spouse living. At the first
appearance of the case,32 the Supreme Court held that in an annul-
ment suit where the wife appears and defends the validity of the
marriage, she is, on proper showing, in a position to claim alimony
pendente lite and counsel fees. At the second,33 the court held that
the fact that defendant wife had, after her purported marriage
to plaintiff, brought a successful divorce action against the other
man, being induced to do so by the plaintiff (in this annulment
action), did not estop her in the annulment proceeding from testi-
fying that the so-called marriage to the purported first husband
was in fact no marriage at all. In the fourth appearance of the
case it was held that because plaintiff had lived with the defend-
ant six months after knowing of prior marriage, he was not en-
titled to relief in equity.3 4 Also he had not shown that he did not
have an adequate remedy at law.35 In the very recent case of Cox
v. Armstrong, it 'Was held that where the wife commenced a di-
vorce action and was lated adjudged insane, a conservator, ap-
pointed for her estate and directed to represent her interests in
the divorce action, could properly file an amended petition in the
divorce action praying for annulment.
DIVORCE
It is not intended in this review to discuss anything but mat-
ters of substantive law. However, it is deemed proper to call at-
tention to certain late statutes affecting procedure.
By statute,36 in 1945, it was enacted that procedure in actions
of divorce, annulment, and separate maintenance, unless other-
wise expressly provided, "shall be ... as provided for by the Rules
of Civil Procedure . . . for civil actions." The trial 37 of such ac-
tions shall not be had until after the expiration of thirty days
from filing of the complaint, and any party to a divorce action,
"may demand or waive a trial by jury 38 in the manner and
method" provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure. The act also
repealed sections 4, 5, 9, 10, and 12 of chapter 56, '35 C.S.A.
It is of interest to note that in 1947 an act 39 was passed giving
Colorado courts of competent jurisdiction in this state powers to
32Pierce v. Otte, 111 Colo. 374, 142 P. 2d 283 (1943).
,3 Otte v. Pierce, 111 Colo. 386, 142 P. 2d 280 (1943). The third appearance of the
case involved no question of significance. Otte v. Pierce, 116 Colo. 77, 178 P. 2d 676
(1947).
3Otte v. Pierce, 118 Colo. 123, 194 P. 2d 331 (1948). The more approved rule
seems contra. "Where it appears to the court that a marriage is an absolute nullity
the duty. . . is to decree such a marriage void and prevent any further criminal union
of the parties." Simmons v. Simmons, 19 Fed. 2d 690, 54 A.L.R. 75 (1927). See also,
41 HARV. LAW REv. 1059 (1928).
"One wonders whether plaintiff would get his remedy at law. See Garver v.
Garver, 52 1Colo. 227, 127 P. 165 (1912).
3COLO. LAWS, §1, p. 316 (1945) ; COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 56, §5 (1) (Supp. 1949).
37OoLo. LAWS, §2, p. 316 (1945) COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 56, §10 (1) (Supp. 1949).
ICOLO. LAWS, §4, p. 316 (1945); COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 56, §9 (1) (Supp. 1949).
Prior to this statute, it had been held under see. 10, c. 56, '35 C.S.A., that in a con-
tested case the verdict of a jury was absolutely essential as a prerequisite for a decree
in divorce. Simmons v. Simmons, 107 Colo. 78, 108 P. 2d 871 (1941); Johnson v.
Johnson, 22 Colo. 20, 43 P. 130, 55 Am. St. Rep. 113 (1895).
"COLo. LAWS, §1, 2, p. 398 (1947); COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 56, §39 (Supp. 1949).
See Unused Colorado Enforcement Statute, by Robert P. Davison and Houston Q.
Williams, 21 RocKy MT. L. REY. 385 (1949).
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enforce orders, judgments, and decrees of other states on proper
docketing of exemplified copies thereof, providing such other
jurisdictions shall have reciprocal provisions for enforcing like
orders entered in the state of Colorado. A second paragraph of
this statute covers somewhat similar matters. The author of this
article knows of no other state having reciprocal provisions.
Divorce cases discussed herein are a few of the great number
appearing in the Supreme Court of Colorado in the past decade.
40
Two cases were concerned with the problem of whether the
necessary residence requirements were satisfied to give the court
jurisdiction under the Colorado statute.41  In Simmons v. Sim-
mons,4' a wife had left the matrimonial domicile in Kansas to
return to her parents home in Colorado because of alleged cruelty.
The husband followed her, to persuade her to return and she agreed
to do so. Before she left Colorado, the husband violated terms of
the agreement. The court held that the wife had a right to renew
her expressed intention to remain in Colorado for at least a year.
In Harms v. Harms,43 plaintiff, seeking a divorce on the ground
of cruelty, alleged and proved more than the necessary residence
before commencement of the action. Defendant, who had resided
in Co!orado for less than one year, filed a cross-complaint on the
same grounds, and was granted a divorce thereon. It was held
that plaintiff's allegations and proof vested the court with juris-
diction of the plaintiff and the subject matter, and that the court
could retain jurisdiction until the equities were settled. Defend-
ant husband under such circumstances was not limited to acts of
cruelty committed by the plaintiff wife in Colorado, if confined
to acts of cruelty subsequent to date of marriage but prior to
date of filing of plaintiff's complaint. The case was reversed on
the ground that defendant should not have been permitted to put
in evidence acts of cruelty committed subsequent to filing of com-
plaint and up to the date of trial without supplemental pleadings
as to such acts.
The effect of the death of a party to a divorce suit was the
problem involved in McLaughlin v. Craig.44 The defendant hus-
band died within six months after an interlocutory decree had
been entered in favor of the plaintiff. It was held that the action
abated and that plaintiff became defendant's widow entitled to
the widow's allowance.
45
40 An interesting article is Divorce Practice in Colorado by Stevens Park Kinney,
21 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 358 (1949).'COLO. STAT. ANN.. C. 56, §6 (1935), provides: "No person shall be granted a
divorce unless such person has been a bona fide resident and citizen of this state dur-
ing the one year next -prior to the commencement of the action . . . provided, this
section shall not affect applications for a divorce upon the grounds of adultery or
extreme cruelty, where the offense was committed within this state."
42 Snpra note 38.
43120 Colo. 212, 209 P. 2d 552 (1949). See, Residence of Plaintiff in Colorado
Necessary to Support a Divorce Action, etc., Edwin M. Sears, 24 Dicta 110 (1947).
" 117 Colo. 67, 184 P. 2d 130 (1917). Cf. Parsons v. Parsons, 70 Colo. 154, 198
P. 156 (1921), construing a statute now repealed.
4A prior property settlement evidently was not affected, but as plaintiff had not
waived the widow's allowance, she was entitled thereto. See supra, note 26; also




There is reiteration of established propositions concerning
alimony, such as, that the statute 46 does not compel a court to
grant alimony,47 that an award of alimony, "rests in the sound
discretion of the trial court ... and what is, and what is not, rea-
sonable and where a reasonable discretion ends and arbitrary ac-
tion begins are not susceptible of mathematical demonstration." 48
A divorce court may properly award alimony in a lump sum.
49
The award of a lump sum as alimony for the purchase of a home
in addition to periodic payments for alimony and support for a
minor child was approved in one case, ° but in a later case was
refused on the basis that no award of custody of a minor was in-
volved. 51 The continuing authority of the trial court to modify
alimony awards is reiterated.
52
DIVISION OF PROPERTY IN DIvORcE
A number of recent cases distinguish a division of property
from alimony. Very recently the Colorado Supreme Court 53 in
construing Kansas Law quoted a Kansas decision: "Alimony has
as its basis the right to maintenance only. Division of property
has as its basis the right to a just and equitable share of the prop-
erty." The Colorado theory is stated in Schreyer v. Schreyer:
54
"The property recovery that Mrs. Schreyer enjoyed was not based
on her right as a wife or Schreyer's responsibilities as a husband.
The property award was made on the basis that it was jointly
accumulated and owned by the parties." The court decreed the
division of a taxi business created by their joint efforts. See also,
Shapiro v. Shapiro,5 5 in which it was held that services rendered
outside the wife's duties as a wife entitled her to property division
as well as alimony, although the statute 56 provides in terms that
the court may, on granting the divorce, provide for reasonable
alimony, or may decree a division of property. The word or was
construed as synonymous with and. In a proper case,5 7 the facts
may be such as to require a transfer from the wife to the husband.
A divorce court has no continuing power to modify its divi-
sion of property orders. 58 This is so whether the settlement was
'COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 56, §8 (1935).
cLiebhardt Case. supra note 28.
48Urling v. Urling, 107 Colo. 186, 109 P. 2d 1060 (1941) ; Zook v. Zook, 118 Colo.
299. 304, 195 P. 2d 387 (1948).
49 Flfer v. Fifer, 119 Colo. 239, 202 P. 2d 945 (1949). In this case, the divorce de-
cree ordered defendant to make certain regular payments on a note secured by a trust
deed on real estate jointly owned by the parties. On default, the husband being outside
the jurisdiction of the court, trial court's order divesting the defendant of his interest
in the property and vesting it in the wife was approved.
mUrling v. Urling, supra note 48.
:'Zook v. Zook, supra note 48.
82 Ibid, p. 302; Pifer v. Fifer, supra note 49.
"3United States National Bank v. Bartges, 120 Colo. 317, 210 P 2d 600 (1949).
5"113 Colo. 219, 155 P. 2d 990 (1945).
"115 Colo. 505, 176 P. 2d 363 (1947).
"COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 56, §8 (1935).
" Bieber v. Bieber, 112 Colo. 229, 148 P. 2d 369 (1944). In this case the husband
furnished all the consideration for a house title to which was placed in the wife's name.
See also, Enforcement of Divorce in Colorado, by William Hedges Robinson, Jr., 21
ROCKY MT. L. REv. 364, 369 (1949).
58Zlaten v. Zlaten, 117 Colo. 296, 186 P. 2d 583 (1947).
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by contract, approved by the court and made part of its decree,
or whether it was a "determination of the property rights of the
parties by the court itself." 59 In a recent case,60 the former wife
was held entitled to damages against the husband for his fraud
in obtaining a property settlement based on a financial statement
in which he concealed assets.
MERGER OF PROPERTY SETTLEMENTS IN DIVORCE DECREE
Four cases 61 discussed the problem of how a property settle-
ment between spouses becomes merged in the divorce decree. The
cases unanimously held that mere reference and approval by the
court is not sufficient. To be enforceable as a decree of court the
rights and obligations of the settlement should be specifically set
forth in its decree so that the rights and duties may be ascertained
from the decree itself. In McWilliams v. McWilliams,62 there was
mere reference to, and approval of, the property and financial set-
tlement in the interlocutory decree of the county court so the
settlement was not enforceable as part of the decree. Therefore,
the obligation to pay $50 per month to the divorced wife as part
of the contract still subsisted, and, although the husband had al-
ready paid $2,000 into the registry of the county court, he was
liable on the unmerged contract in a district court action for delin-
quent payments. In the Campbell case,63 the contract was also
merely referred to with approval. The defendant became delin-
quent in his payments, but enforcement could not be had by means
of contempt proceedings. There was no order of court upon which
such proceedings could be based. In the Edwards 64 and Bartges 65
cases, liability was for a like reason based on the contract and not
the decree.
CUSTODY OF CHILDREN
A divorce court, of course, has jurisdiction to award custody
of children as part of the decree.6 6 Custody may also be awarded
in a controversy between the parents, or between one or both and
a third person through habeas corpus proceedings. However, the
decree of the divorce court awarding custody is res adjudicata un-
less there is a later change of conditions.
67
-Ibid, 299.
d United States National Bank v. Bartges, supra, note 53.
0 McWilliams v. McWilliams, 110 Colo. 173, 132 P. 2d 966 (1942) ; Campbell v.
Goodbar, 110 Colo. 403, 134 P. 2d 1060 (1943) ; Edwards v. Edwards, 113 Colo. 390, 157
P. 2d 616; United States National Bank v. Bartges, supra, note 53. See also Incorporation
by Reference in Colorado, by John Barnard, Jr., 21 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 420 (1949)
Enforcement of Divorce Decrees in Colorado. supra, note 56, pp. 365, 367.
02 Cited last note.
"Supra, note 61.
64 Supra, note 61.
65 Supra, note 61.
N Peterson v. Schwartzmann, 116 Colo. 235, 179 P. 2d 662 (1947).
01 Snyder v. Schmoyer, 106 Colo. 295, 104 P. 2d 612 (1940) ; McMillin v. McMillin,
114 Colo. 247, 158 P. 2d 444, 160 A.L.R. 396 (1945) ; Crocker v. Crocker, Advance
Sheet, Colo. Bar Ass'n, June 10, 1950. The divorce court seems the proper court to
modify the award of custody when there is a change of conditions, Searle v. Searle,
115 Colo. 266, 172 P. 2d 837 (1946); Emerson v. Emerson, 117 Colo. 384, 188 P. 2d
252 (1948). Except if the state of domicile of the child has been changed, McMillin v.
McMillin, supra.
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A number of cases considered problems of conflict of juris-
diction between a divorce court and a court exercising juvenile
jurisdiction. In a late case, it was held that the fact that the best
interests of a child might be bettered will not permit a court exer-
cising juvenile court jurisdiction to take control and declare the
child a dependent as against a divorce court's award unless de-
pendency, such as neglect, improper conditions, etc., actually ex-
ists.6s If dependency actually exists, the juvenile court is not bound
by the prior award.69
In a recent article 70 by two leading Colorado authori-
ties 71 on such matters, it is stated:
It seems clear upon reflection of the cases in this jurisdiction
that although the juvenile court, or the county court as the case may
be, has jurisdiction upon a dependency issue to reaward the custody
of a child despite a divorce court's decree, that the Supreme Court,
understandably, shows considerable reluctance to permit the divorced
parents to parade the children from court room to court room unless
a new ground for dependency exists. It would seem further that
either the juvenile court for the best interests of the child, or the
divorce court, becaused of changed conditions could, if necessary,
reaward custody. Ultimately the question resolves into unnecessary
duplication of jurisdiction.
ILLEGITIMACY
Nuiman v. Cooper 72 involved a dependency proceeding in
which a woman charged respondent with being the father of her
child. The woman's husband had obtained a divorce from her in
New York on the ground of adultery. The divorce action was un-
contested. In that action the plaintiff's husband was permitted
to testify as to nonaccess for the period of conception to prove
the child's illegitimacy, and therefore, the wife's adultery. In the
dependency action in Colorado, testimony by her of such nonaccess
was held properly admitted to prove the child was not her ex-hus-
band's. A transcript of the husband's testimony in the divorce
case was, however, improperly admitted, the husband not having
been subjected to cross-examination.
ADOPTION
In a proceeding to determine heirship,7 3 the validity of the
68 Peterson v. Schwartzmann, supra, note 66, at p. 241 : Snyder v. Schmoyer, supra,
note 67, at p. 296; Arnett v. Northern, 118 Colo. 307, 194 P. 2d 909 (1948).
69Orebaugh v. People, 120 Colo. 377, 209 P. 2d 922 (1949). In Phillips v. Christen-
sen, (Colo.) 216 P. 2d 659 (1950), a dependency court's award to maternal grandpar-
ents was held to be invalid where the father was given no notice of such proceeding.
The divorce court modified its original decree of divided custody to parents, to an
award to the father alone despite the intervening dependency order. The primary right
of the natural parent to custody was emphasized and changed circumstances Justified
the change in its own original decree.
70 The State as Parens Patriae, 21 RocKy MT. L. REV. 375, 383 (1949).
7"Judge Philip B. Gilliam, Judge of the Juvenile Court of the City and County of
Denver; and Thomas A. Gilliam of the Denver Bar.
72120 Colo. 98, 207 P. 2d 814 (1949).
73Zupancis v. Zupancis, 107 Colo. 323, 111 P. 2d 1063 (1941).
407DICTANovember, 1950
adoption of a child by an intestate was questioned by the latter's
widow. The basis of the attack was that the material facts stated
in the adoption petition, which were necessary to give the county
court jurisdiction, were untrue. It was held that in a collateral
attack on an adoption, as in this heirship proceeding, extrinsic
evidence could not be introduced to show the alleged falsity, the
adoption record being regular on its face. Such extrinsic evidence
may be introduced only in a proceeding directly attacking the
adoption. In this case there were also facts which may have oper-
ated as an estoppel against the widow.
Two cases reaffirmed the accepted construction of the 1931
statute 74 that an adopted child inherits from an adoptive parent
but not through such parent. In the first case, 75 intestate's brother
had adopted a child. The brother died before the intestate. In
a determination of heirship proceeding, certain cousins of the
intestate were declared her heirs at law. The deceased brother's
adopted child got nothing. A similar case was Coffman v. Howell.
76
Both cases mentioned the 1941 amendment 77 to the intestacy law.
The court conceded in the latter case, that its holding in the par-
ticular case being considered, would have favored the adopted
child, had the 1941 amendment been in effect at intestate's death.
In a case 71 involving the construction of a trust instrument,
the court, in effect, ruled that if in a will or trust the testator
makes provision for his own "child or children," there is a pre-
sumption that the adopted child is included in the class with chil-
dren of the blood. A presumption prevails against the inclusion
of the foster child as beneficiary where the instrument is executed
by one person in favor of the "child and children" of another.
Another late case 79 dealt with an amendment to the inherit-
ance tax law, placing persons over the age of twenty-one when
adopted in a higher tax bracket than persons under the age of
twenty-one years when adopted. This discrimination was held
unconstitutional on the facts appearing in the record.
It is to be noted that a new act 80 governing adoption pro-
cedure and the status of adopted children went into effect in 1949.
14 COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 176, §4 (1935). See Smith v. Greenburg, 218 P. 2d 514
(1950). Man murdered wife and adoptive daughter in that order, then killed self.
Daughter was held to have inherited one half mother's property, and on her death, the
murderer inherited adopted daughter's property. See statutes cited under note 77,
15Rogers v. Green, 111 Colo. 85, 137 P. 2d 408 (1943).
16Ill Colo. 359, 141 P. 2d 1017 (1943).
"COLO. LAWS, C. 235, §16, p. 908 (1941) ; COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 176, §4 (1935).
Compare also, CoLo. LAW, §11, p. 210 (1949) ; COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 4, §17 (Supp. 1949),
with Sec. 5, Ch. 4, '35 C.S.A. repealed by the 1949 act.
SBrunton v. International Trust Co., 114 Colo. 298, 164 P. 2d 472 (1945). In this
case it was stated that its results were not inconsistent with the holdings of the last
two cited cases, supra, notes 75 and 76, although the statutes construed therein govern
only intestacy cases and cannot be applied to the provisions of a will or trust. What
effect, if any, will the 1941 amendments, supra, note 77, have on will and trust cases?
"Hogan v. People, 120 Colo. 581, 212 P. 2d 863 (1949).
"CoLo. LAWS, p. 206 (1949).
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THE FAMILY AND THE LAW
WARREN V. LATTIMER
of thle Pueblo Bar and Chairman of the Comutitt(x
on Domestic Relations
The family is the cornerstone of our society and as such ap-
pears in danger of disintegration at this time. The family, or the
mating of the male and female and rearing of their offspring, has
been the basis upon which civilization has developed. The child
is moulded in the home and the man he is to become is determined
by his early training to a large extent. It appears today that
family ties and home conditions are less stable than at any time
since the beginning of our civilization.' In the first place, our han-
dling of the family situation in law in general is on a conservative
or, one might almost say, a backward basis.
Law in general lags at all times from five years to a half cen-
tury behind present conditions because civilization and society
must try out certain modes of conduct, then after they become
stylish, or are considered proper, and are adopted by a majority
of the people, they are crystallized into laws. As a result of this
tendency, the laws governing us are always considerably behind
present conditions. It appears at the present, however, that our
laws concerning the family, marriage, and divorce are lagging
further behind than is proper under the circumstances. This is
particularly true of our divorce laws which show a greater lag
in meeting present conditions than is necessary or proper.2
The occasion for this writer's being appointed as chairman
of 'the Domestic Relations Committee of the Colorado Bar Asso-
ciation was that this opinion was expressed at one of the Board
of Governors' meetings last fall. Immediately our good president,
James K. Groves, appointed your writer as chairman of that com-
mittee with instructions to try to correct the evils that we might
discover. After the appointment of the committee, a meeting was
called in Denver, and it was unanimously agreed that Colorado
divorce laws need revising, both as to statute law and as to the
trend of our Supreme Court decisions. Before the committee com-
menced submitting any revisions to the Board of Governors, it
was decided to ascertain by canvass of the state bar, first, whether
the lawyers of the state agreed with us that a revision or change
This trend is reflected in the great number of popular magazine articles that are
being written about marital problems and the broken home. See, for example, article
by Lawrence Galton in Better Homes and Gardens for March, 1950, p. 41 ; "Our Legal
Horror of Divorce," Paul W. Alexander, Ladies Home Journal for October, 1949, p. 65 ;
'Wife Trouble," Mary Fisher Longmuir, American Magazine for February, 1950, p.
36; "Divorces Anonymous," Joseph Milland, 1Redbook Magazine for February, 1950,
p. 14 ; "Divorce," Joseph Israels, Woman's Magazine for June, 1950, p. 21 ; "Do You
Need Help Vith Your Marriage," John F. Cuper, Parents Magazine for February,
1950, p. 32.
'For a humorous treatment of this subject, see Bigelow, The Case of Colorado v.
Rawlings, 35 AM. BAR AssN. JOURNAL 728 (1949).
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was necessary, and second, what matters a majority of the law-
yers felt should be changed at this time.
The response to our questionnaire was very good. A large
proportion of the lawyers of the state took the time to study and
answer the questionnaires, and, by a preponderance of nearly 21/2
to 1, agreed that changes are needed at this time. As to the changes
needed, however, there is a wide difference of opinion, which was
evidenced by numerous comments included on the questionnaires.
The most definite impression received from the. answers to the
questionnaires, however, was that the lawyers of the state are
giving this problem serious consideration and feel that some-
thing should be done concerning the present laws on divorce and
family control.
We might point out at this time that practically every issue
of any current lay magazine has one or more articles concerning
some phase of family life in connection with the law. This indi-
cates that the problem is a red-hot issue nationally, with the lay
public as well as with lawyers. Practically every state in the union
is concerned. In some states, some effort has been made to correct
the situation. We can call attention particularly to three states
that have recently made changes in their law which seem to bring
them up-to-date and more in conformity with present social con-
ditions.
MICHIGAN, OHIO, AND WASHINGTON As MODELS
Michigan is one of the leaders and has made notable progress.3
There, provision has been made for family courts separate from
other judicial bodies in certain areas of the state. Separate courts
for domestic cases, as well as for juvenile cases, have been estab-
lished, and it has been found that the additional expense and costs
of salaries for court officials who follow-up the court decrees for
alimony and support money have been more than repaid in the
form of lightened relief burdens. Likewise, these court attaches
follow-up on custody matters and see that the children of broken
homes have proper care and supervision.The State of Ohio also has made some important changes re-
cently, principally along the same line, that is, in the setting up
of separate courts dealing exclusively with domestic cases. Judge
Paul W. Alexander of Toledo has been responsible for many of
these changes and is still working on the problem to further the
changes throughout his state and in the nation. He is chairman
of the American Bar Association's special committee on domestic
relations and, as such, has been of considerable help to your com-
mittee and its work in Colorado. His article in the ABA Journal
for February, 1950, is very enlightening and shows his approach
to the problem.
4
See the Goode Report, Michigan State Legislature.
Alexander, The Follies of Divorce, 36 Am. BAR AssN. JOURNAL 105 (1950).
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The State of Washington enacted new statutes during the
year 1949 which include the better features of the Michigan and
Ohio plans, but attack the problem from a little different angle.
By this legislation,5 family courts are set up similar to those in
the States of Ohio and Michigan, and court attaches are provided
to investigate into the facts of each divorce case filed. They may
recommend to the judge of the family court the disposition of the
matter, including custody of the children, use and disposition of
property, alimony and support money, the possibility of reconcilia-
tion, and other pertinent matters. In addition to divorce jurisdic-
tion, provision is made for the filing of a petition to invoke the
jurisdiction of the court to attempt to effectuate a reconciliation
of estranged married persons. Hearings may be closed to the
public and to the press when the court sees fit in the interest of
reconciling the parties. It is provided also that the court may
call in physicians, psychiatrists, or any other specialist who may
be able to help solve the problems presented. Another innovation
in the Washington law provides that there shall be no interlocu-
tory decree, but that the parties must wait 90 days after filing
a divorce petition to have a hearing on the merits of the petition.
If the petition is granted it becomes final at once. The 90 day
waiting period is in the interest of effecting a reconciliation and
a thorough investigation into the facts surrounding the petition.
The Washington legislation seems to me to be the most modern
and up-to-date now in existence in the United States.
CONFLICT IN PUBLIC POLICIES
The biggest problem which concerns attorneys as well as lay-
men in divorce matters is the conflict between the public policy
which dictates that divorces be made hard of attainment to avoid
the break-up of families, and the public policy which would make
divorces easy to prevent the adultery and mayhem attendant upon
keeping people married under intolerable conditions. Judge Alex-
ander points out in his article referred to above 6 that these con-
flicts lead to some very ridiculous consequences. Some of these
are evident in the theories of defense to divorces which the law
allows as a bulwark of the family and to prevent the break up
of a home. For instance, recrimination, or the idea that if both
parties to the marriage have committed acts which would be
grounds for divorce, neither may obtain a divorce from the mar-
riage. Apparently the position of the law is that because both
are blameworthy they must both stew in their own mess. Likewise,
I suppose, the children will stew in the same mess, and the courts
will do nothing to help them. Other conflicts, as we see it, in mo-
tives of the law is the rule that there must be no collusion between
5,VASH. LAWS 1949, c. 50, 215.
6 Alexander, supra, note 4.
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the parties, and the further rule that condonation of the acts of
the one sinning by the one sinned against is a bar to the parties
obtaining a divorce. We are unable to see the connection between
these defenses to a divorce and the fundamental question of
whether the parties should be separated for the benefit of them-
selves, or the community, or the children. We believe it would be
better to allow a trained court to determine what is best for the
parties, their children, and the community as a whole, and make
a clean cut decision accordingly. We would like to have this to
develop the interests of the public and the attorneys of the state
to the end that our entire divorce code is rewritten to operate on
a more equitable and sensible basis.
RESPONSE SHOWS COLORADO READY FOR CHANGE
The responses to our questionnaires indicated that the lawyers
of the state are ready for some changes, notably, the forming of
a family or domestic relations court with a separate staff to in-
vestigate and carry out orders of the court in counties of suffi-
cient population. The enactment of a uniform divorce, annulment,
and separate maintenance statute correlated with the laws on
juvenile cases and giving a rather wide latitude to such courts
is also favored. However, the majority of the lawyers feel that
the property rights of the spouses should be defined by statute.
Most of the answers to our questionnaire were very definite and
show that the attorneys have specific ideas about the changes
they want. The ideas of the different attorneys throughout the
state conflict, however, and show the necessity of some study and
education throughout the bar. It is encouraging to note that the
attorneys are interested enough in the problem to want to do
something about it. We believe that a full study of the problems
should be further made and a legislative program worked out
toward better laws concerning the family and domestic relations
in the state. We hope that the committee which succeeds us will
carry on the work toward that end.
RESULTS OF THE DOMESTIC RELATIONS
COMMITTEE'S SURVEY
Some 448 returns thus far have been received on the question-
naires sent out to the membership of the Colorado Bar Association
in July by the Domestic Relations Committee. The following are
the results as reported by Stevens Park Kinney, committee mem-
ber, who undertook the arduous task of tabulating the returns:
Yes No
1. Are you satisfied with existing divorce and annulment laws?.... 124 304
2. Do you favor a separate court for domestic relations matters in
counties of large population? ............... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..... . . . . . . . . . 281 135
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3. Do you favor an officer or department of the court to enforce
collections of court orders and to investigate supplemental ac-
tions in dom estic m atters ................................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  298 115
4. Do you favor the drawing-up of a uniform divorce and annul-
ment act to be submitted to the states for adoption ...................... 354 74
5. Do you believe the bench is giving adequate consideration to
divorce and annulment cases, particularly contempt proceed-
ings? ............................................................................................................ 186 218
6. Do you believe any additional grounds for divorce should be
added in Colorado1 .................................................................................... 144 270
(Incompatibility was the most popular recommended addition)
Or that any existing grounds should be abolished? ....................... 30 213
(Insanity was the ground most generally objected to)
7. Do you favor legislation making it a federal offense for a man
to cross state lines to evade responsibility in supporting his
children, even if such legislation to be effective would necessi-
tate an amendment to the U. S. Constitution? ................................. 3,06 125
8. Do you believe that common-law marriages should be abolished
in C olorado? ................................................................................................ 158 273
9. Do you believe that law schools arc giving adequate instruction
in dom estic relations? .............................................................................. 158 147
10. Do you believe attorneys are giving adequate advice and counsel
to clients in domestic relations problems ................ ..................... 220 144
If not, do you believe attorneys should specialize in domestic
relations? .................................................. 69 151
11. Would it be wise to correlate our laws concerning divorce and
annulment, separate maintenance, juvenile delinquency, and
juvenile dependency in one over-all action, allowing a court of
competent jurisdiction considerable leeway in dealing with the
parties as their need appears? ............................................................. 266 144
12. Should we do away with the theories of collusion, recrimination
and condonation as defenses in divorce actions? .............................. 212 200
13. Should the county court jurisdictional restriction of $2,000 in
civil actions be removed in divorce cases .................... 220 197
14. In the interest of reconciling the parties, should the state by
law close divorce files from newspaper publication in order to
keep domestic troubles from becoming public? ................................. 226 199
15. Should the respective property rights of the spouses as to prop-
erty of either acquired prior to marriage and acquired during
the marriage be defined clearly by statute' ...................................... 299 123
16. Should children be represented as active parties in interest in
divorce actions? ... ................................ ................................................... 204 205
17. Do you favor Colorado adopting an act to enforce support money
payments entered by courts of other states when the supporting
parent has become a resident of this state ........................................ 377 54
18. Do you believe that the six-month period required to obtain a
final decree of divorce should be
lengthened ........................................................................................ 23
shortened ............................................. .............. ................... 77
rem ain as is ....................................................................................... 292
or left to the discretion of the court'......................46
19. Do you believe in granting divorce decrees on the philosophy of
diagnosis and therapy designed in each case for what is best for
the fam ily and society? ........................................................................... 275
Or do you believe we should continue with the old system of
guilt and punishment and the antagonistic divorce' ........................ 107
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THE PRESUMPTION OF DEATH AND
A SECOND MARRIAGE
JASON W. KELLAHIN*
It is well-settled that under the common law a second mar-
riage is invalid where one of the parties has a spouse living and
undivorced. 1 Such marriages have generally been treated as void
ab initio,2 and the rule applies equally to common law and cere-
monial marriages. 3 Generally this is true whether the second mar-
riage is meretricious or founded on mistake.4 No divorce is re-
quired to dissolve such invalid marriages. 5 All American jurisdic-
tions today make a bigamous marriage void, and under their
criminal statutes bigamy is a crime.
To give some relief from the harsh application of this rule,
particularly in bigamy prosecutions, the courts have frequently
applied the presumption that the prior marriage has been dis-
solved either by death or divorce, in order to hold the second mar-
riage valid.6 Generally this presumption is held to be stronger
than that favoring the continued existence of the first marriage. 7
In many states the presumption of validity of the second mar-
riage is strengthened by statute. Some such statutes permit a
remarriage when one of the spouses is generally believed to be
dead or is absent and unheard of for a period of years, usually
ranging from three to seven. Occasionally these statutes provide
for presumption of death, and declare the second marriage valid
until held void by a court of competent jurisdiction." Others merely
serve as a bar to a prosecution for bigamy. The Colorado statute
on bigamy 9 is of the latter type, providing, after a definition of
the crime:
Nothing herein contained shall extend to any person or persons
whose husband or wife shall have been continually absent from
such person or persons for the space of five years prior to the sec-
ond marriage, and he or she not knowing such husband or wife to
be living at that time.
Student, University of Denver College of Law.
'Riddlesden v. Wogan, Cro. Eliz. 858, 78 Eng. Rep. 1084 (1601) ; Pride v. Bath,
1 Salk 120, 91 Eng. Rep. 113 (1695).
2'Glass v. Glass, 114 Mass., 563 (1874); Pain v. Pain, 37 Mo. App. 110 (1889);
Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 52, 4 Am. Dec. 244 (1809) ; Thomas v. Thomas, 124
Pa. 646, 17 A. 182 (1889).
3Valdez v. Shaw, 100 Colo. 101, 66 P. 2d 325 (1937) ; Otte v. Pierce, 118 Colo. 123,
194 P. 2d 331 (1948): Greene v. Greene, 156 Fla. 408, 22 So. 2d 792 (1945); In re
Cline's Est., 128 Pa. Super. 309, 194 A. 222 (1937).
4 Bell v. Tenn. Coal, Iron & R. Co., 240 Ala. 422, 199 So. 813 (1941) ; Cartwrlght
v. State, 64 Ga. App. 51, 12 S. E. 2d 370 (1940) ; Pain v. Pain, supra, note 2.
Riddlesden v. Wogan, Pride v. Bath, supra, note 1.
a Shreyer v. Shreyer, 113 Colo. 219, 155 P. 2d 990 (1945) ; Tyll v. Keller, 94 N. J.
Eq. 426, 120 A. 6 (1923) ; Smith v. Fuller, 138 Iowa 91, 115 N. W. 912 (1908) ; Lamp-
kin v. Travelers' Ins. Co., 11 Colo. App. 249, 52 P. 1040 (1898).
1 Shreyer v. Shreyer, Tyli v. Keller, supra, note 6; Smith v. Fuller, 138 Iowa 91,
108 N. W. (1906).
sRe Harrlngton, 140 Cal. 244, 73 P. 1000 (1903) ; Valleau v. Valleau, 6 Paige
(N. Y.) 207 (1836).
9COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 48, §201 (1935).
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Numerous cases have arisen where parties, in reliance on this
statutory presumption, or on the common law presumption of
death after seven years absence, have contracted a second marriage.
The words are frequently quoted from Glass v. Glass 10 that,
Though a man marry ever so often, he can have but one lawful
wife living. So long as she is living and the marriage bond remains
in full force, all his subsequent marriages, whether meretricious or
founded on mistake, and at the time supposed to be lawful, are
utterly null and void.
Nevertheless, the courts have not required direct proof that the
first spouse is deceased or has been divorced. Instead they have
treated the presumption of death or divorce as rebuttable. Failure
to rebut it has resulted in almost uniform decisions that the sec-
ond marriage was valid."
In the Colorado case of Shreyer v. Shreyer 12 the court said:
The presumption of the continuance of a previous marriage in
itself is not equal in probative force to the presumption of the valid-
ity of the subsequent marriage. It is presumed in favor of the subse-
quent marriage, that the previous marriage has been dissolved by
death, divorce, or annulment.
Such holdings are usually based upon the presumption that no
person will commit a crime.' 3
THE "ENOCH ARDEN" SITUATION
It is where the presumption has been successfully rebutted
that serious questions arise under the so-called "Enoch Arden"
situation, i.e., that after a subsequent marriage which is proper
under the presumption of death, the prior spouse is discovered to
be alive.
Even at common law, good faith in contracting the second
marriage has been held a defense to a criminal action for bigamy.
In Reg. v. Tolson 14 the wife reasonably believed her husband had
been lost on a ship bound for America. Before seven years had
elapsed, she married again, without benefit of a divorce. Unon
the first husband's return, she was charged with bigamy. With
an extended and valuable discussion of the doctrine of mens rea,
the court held that a bona fide belief, based on reasonable grounds,
in the death of the husband at the time of the second marriage
afforded a good defense to the indictment, and a lower court con-
viction was reversed.
Most courts, however, hold that intent is not an element of
the statutory crime of bigamy, 15 as it was under the English stat-
ute involved in Reg. v. Tolson. 6 To avoid the obvious injustice
1o Supra, note 2.
11 Inhabitants of Hiram v. Pierce, 45 Me. 367, 71 Am. Dec. 555 (1858) ; In re Dun-
can's Est., 190 S. C. 211, 2 S. E. 2d 388 (1939) ; Shreyer v. Shreyer, supra, note 6.
12Ibid.
I Lampkin v. Travelers' Ins. Co., supra, note 6.
14 23 Q.B.D. 168, 8 Eng. Rul. Cas. 16 (1889).
"5Rand v. State, 129 Ala. 119, 29 So. 844 (1901).
',Clark & Marshall, Crimes, (4th Ed.) §41, note 9.
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that might arise from this situation, most bigamy statutes today
contain provisions similar to that of the Colorado statute, barring
prosecution where the second marriage follows an absence of the
first spouse for a stated period of time.
17
But do such statutes validate the second marriage, where the
presumption of death has been rebutted? It has generally been
held they have no such effect. In Fenton v. Reed 18 the court ruled:
The statute concerning bigamy does not render the second mar-
riage legal, notwithstanding the former husband or wife may have been
absent above five years, and not heard of. It only declares that the
party who marries again, in consequence of such absence of the for-
met partner, shall be exempted from the operation of the statute,
and leaves the question on the validity of the second marriage just
where it found it.
Strict compliance with provisions of the statute is generally
required, and its protection is usually extended only to the inno-
cent party. A deserting husband who remarried while his first
wife continued to reside at the matrimonial domicile, the Colorado
Supreme Court held, was not entitled to the benefit of the statu-
tory exception.19
While exceptions to prosecution included in bigamy statutes
have not been construed to validate a second marriage, occasional
recourse has been had to other statutes to accomplish this purpose,
where justice seemed to require such result.
LEGITIMACY STATUTES AND ESTOPPEL
In the Missouri case of Phillips v. Wilson 20 a liberal interpre-
tation was given to a statute providing that, "the issue of all mar-
riages decreed null in law, or dissolved by divorce, shall be legi-
timate."
The husband had separated from his first wife, without a
divorce. He then told his second wife he was, "loose from that
woman and we can make an agreement which is a common law
marriage and it will be good." In reliance thereon, the second wife
lived with the husband until his death. The first wife also remar-
ried, making a statement under oath in her application for a
license, that she was single and free to marry. On the husband's
death she contested the second wife's right to administration of
his estate. The court said:
Although a marriage may be unlawful because either the man
or the woman has another spouse living at the time of the marriage,
from whom he or she was not divorced, still, if either one of them
married in good faith, believing that death or divorce had removed
all obstacle to their marriage, such marriage will be deemed void-
Supra, note 9.
"8 4 Johns. (N. Y.) 52, 4 Am. Dec. 244 (1809) : See also In Re 1(utter's Est., 139
N. Y. S. 693; 79 Misc. 74 (1913).
! Sehell v. People, 65 Colo. 116, 173 P. 1141 (1918). Cf. Magee v. People, 79 Colo.
328, 245 P. 708 (1926).
20298 Mo. 186, 250 S. XV. 408 (1923).
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able only, and not void, and the children of such a marriage are legi-
timate and may inherit, as legal heirs, the property of their parents.
No mention was made in the Phillips decision of the fact the
first wife had also remarried. The Mississippi court, however, in
the decision of Harper v. Fears,21 which has apparently been over-
ruled, relied on estoppel of the first wife to speak, in holding a
second marriage by the husband valid, under similar circumstances.
This case involved a dispute over the estate of the husband. The
language of the court is interesting in that it demonstrates a re-
luctance frequently shown in other decisions against flatly saying
a second marriage is absolutely void under all circumstances where
the presumption of dissolution of the first has been rebutted:
It seems to us, when the period of absence has existed for seven
years, the absent party not being heard from during that time, and
the presumption being that he is dead, and the wife having acted
upon such presumption in good faith and contracted another mar-
riage, such marriage is legal . . . if the law itself acts upon the pre-
sumption, we see no reason why a party acting upon it in good faith,
,by contracting an irrevocable status affecting the honor and legi-
timacy of other people, should not so act and such act be valid.
Why should the law permit a person to withdraw himself for a
long period, such as seven years, without communication to his family
and friends, and by such act cause another to remarry, and then by
returning to his original surroundings, bastardize innocent children?
Under the facts in the case at bar, the appellant was estopped to set
up her claim.
In Frank v. Frank 22 the majority of the court disclaimed that
they were overruling Harper v. Fears, and said that decision was
based on (1) the presumption of a divorce arising from the con-
traction of a second marriage, and (2) the estoppel of the wife
who had entered into a second marriage to challenge the validity
of the second marriage of her former husband. Two justices dis-
sented, one of them saying, "The statutory presumption of death
ought to be conclusive in such a case. In other words it ought to
be equivalent to a divorce." Both said the language of Harper v.
Fears was "too plain to be brushed away by interpretation."
In order to hold issue of a second marriage legitimate, the
Georgia court, in Eubanks v. Banks,2 3 placed its decision squarely
on an exception in a bigamy statute saying that under the common
law such a marriage was excused from the penalties of bigamy,
"and unless the marriage was dissolved by the judgment of law,
the marriage was treated as legal and the issue held to be legi-
timate." At most, the court added, "by common law, the second
marriage would have been held simply voidable," but cited no
authority to support this view.
21Harper v. Fears, 168 Miss. 505, 151 So. 745 (1934), apparently overruled by
Frank v. Frank, 193 Miss. 605, 10 So. 2d 839 (1942).
Ibid.
234 Ga. 407 (1866).
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In a later case,24 however, the Georgia court declined to pursue
this line of reasoning further. It held that where a wife remarried
in good faith after her first husband had been absent for seven
years, without knowing that the first husband was still alive, the
second marriage was void. The wife, furthermore, was not incom-
petent to testify against the second husband in a prosecution of
the second husband for murder. "The presumption of death of a
spouse, arising after an absence of seven years," the court said,
"must yield to proof of facts to the contrary."
COLORADO'S SITUATION AND REMEDIES THEREFOR
Colorado has apparently never held its bigamy statute to
validate a second marriage in reliance on the presumption of death
of or divorce from the first spouse. But in Davis v. People 25 it
was said that death of or divorce from the former spouse may
validate the subsequent marriage contracted in good faith.
An analogy could perhaps be drawn between the reasoning
applied in the Missouri case of Phillips v. Wilson and the Colo-
rado statutes on divorce and annulment which provide that neither
a decree of divorce or annulment shall affect the legitimacy of
any child born as the issue of such voided, void, or voidable mar-
riage.26 The provision for legitimatizing the issue of a marriage
which has been annulled was strictly construed, however, by the
Colorado Supreme Court. In Valdez v. Shaw 27 it was held that
the provision of the statute applied only to cases where an annul-
ment proceeding is brought. No element of good faith was involved
in this case, however. A different result might be reached were
that element present.
The Colorado court indulged in some interesting language in
Otte v. Pierce,28 indicating that the purported wife who had mar-
ried a second time without divorce has at least some right to rec-
ognition under this second marriage. In denying the equitable
relief of annulment to the husband on the grounds he had continued
to live with the wife some six months after he learned of the im-
pediment to her second marriage, the court added:
In case there should be further proceedings between the parties
for divorce or separate maintenance, it is pertinent here to observe
. . . that repeated references to the defendant in the trial court as
"Mrs. Otte," or "Florence Otte" or in any manner other than "Pierce,"
was unfair, improper, and probably prejudicial to her rights. Defend-
ant's name is now, and ever since August 2, 1939 (the date of the
second marriage to Pierce), has been "Pierce," and will so remain
until her marriage is annulled or dissolved by proper decree of the
court.
24Cartwright v. State, 64 Ga. Anp. 51, 12 S. E. 2d 370 (1940).
83 Colo. 295, 264 P. 658 (1928).
28 1935 COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 56, §38.
2100 Colo. 101, 66 P. 2d 325 (1937).
2Sl11 Colo. 123, 194 P. 2d 331 (1948).
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This would seem to indicate that the Colorado court sees some
necessity for divorce or annulment to invalidate the second mar-
riage where one of the parties has a living, undivorced spouse by
a prior marriage.
The general trend of the decisions today seems directed to-
ward holding the second marriage invalid in accordance with the
general common law rule, where only the parties to the marriage
are involved in the suit. But where the legitimacy of children is
involved, there is a strong tendency to find grounds for holding
the marriage valid, or at least only voidable, without too much
discussion of the common law rule, even in the absence of statute.
Logically, since the court is dealing with a problem of status in
most such cases, there seems no reason why the rule should not
be the same under either circumstance. No decision was found
where the court admitted there was such a difference in applica-
tion of the general rule. The same tendency applies to a lesser extent
where the attack is made on the second, disputed marriage after
the death of one of the parties to such marriage. There is an
especial tendency to support validity of marriages that have con-
tinued uninterrupted for a long period of years, and where the
rights of children to the estate of the deceased parent are involved.
Today the legitimacy of children of such marriages has been
pretty well cleared up by statute. There is also a strong trend
toward rendering these second marriages voidable only by stat-
ute. A California law is typical of these. It holds the second mar-
riage valid until its nullity has been adjudged by a competent
tribunal.29 Other statutes make a person whose spouse has not
been heard from for a specified time competent to marry.30 But
good faith in presuming the former spouse is dead or divorced
is generally held essential under statutes of this type, and again,
in absence of express provisions for validity, the second marriage
would probably be held voidable. A realistic approach is shown
by the New York statute which provides for dissolution of the
first marriage. 31 The subsequent marriage then is valid, even
though the former spouse should later be discovered to be alive.
Obviously the safest approach to the problem is to advise
divorce or annulment before a second marriage is undertaken, if
there is any doubt as to the death of the first spouse. But such
a course will seldom take care of those persons who, in a reason-
able belief their spouse is dead, remarry, only to have the first
spouse reappear. Typical of such situation is that where the hus-
band has been reported a war casualty. The dearth of cases in-
volving this question indicates that the parties settle the problem
amicably among themselves when "Enoch Arden" returns. These
"Re Harrington, 140 Cal. 244, 73 P. 1000 (1903).
3Rhea v. Rhenner, 1 Pet. (U. S.) 105. 7 L. Ed. 72 (1828) (Md. statute).
3 Thompson's Laws of New York (1939), Domestic Relations, §7a. C. Goset v.
Goset, 112 Ark. 47, 164 S. W. 759 (1914).
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amicable settlements arising out of World War II may yet come
back to harass the administrators of estates and cloud titles in
the years to come unless handled by resort to the courts.
In view of the present state of the law, the proper solution
probably would be legislation similar to that of California, hold-
ing such second marriages, contracted in good faith, valid until
declared invalid by a court of competent jurisdiction. Such legis-
lation should also include a bar to any collateral attack on the
second marriage, in order to preserve with some degree of cer-
tainty the rights of children or heirs of parties to such marriage.
JOHNSON V. SHRIVER: POWERS, USES AND
THE RULE IN SHELLEY'S CASE
In Barnard v. Moore,' Mr. Justice Denison said, "We shall
assume, without deciding, that the rule in Shelley's Case is in
force in Colorado, i.e., if a freehold estate be limited to A, re-
mainder to his heirs, he takes a fee simple. .. ."
Johnson v. Shriver 2 comes very close to deciding that the Rule
in Shelley's Case is not in force in Colorado. The interests involved
were created by the following language: " . . . in trust for the
said Ada Conroe, for and during her natural life. . . . Upon the
death of the said Ada Conroe . . . then said property shall vest in
the heirs at law of said Ada Conroe .... .
This language falls squarely within the Rule in Shelley's Case
as that Rule was stated by Mr. Justice Denison. A freehold is
limited to Ada Conroe, remainder to her heirs. Yet it was held,
without referring to the Rule, that Ada Conroe did not take a fee
simple. Is this a repudiation of the Rule, or did the facts bring
this case within an exception to the Rule? This is a difficult ques-
tion.
Ada Conroe's interest was expressly limited to a life estate,
but that of course would not prevent the operation of the Rule-
in fact, it is one of the prerequisites that the ancestor be given
an estate less than a fee simple. Otherwise the interest limited
to his heirs would not be a remainder, but would be an executory
interest, and the Rule applies (except in the case of appointed
interests) only to remainders.
It might be proper to suggest parenthetically that the remark-
able persistence of the Rule seems not to be attributable so much
to a fondness for the feudal doctrine, or to an indifference to mani-
fested intention, as to its modern effectiveness as a means of clear-
ing titles.
'71 Colo. 401, 406, 207 P. 332, . . . (1922).
2- Colo. -, 216 P. 2d 653 (1950). It Is assumed that the reader of these com-




For example, in this very case the Abstract of Record, p. 23,
states that, ".... the abstract (of title) . . . shows two attempts
by the testatrix (Ada Conroe) to alienate parts of the trust prop-
erty in her lifetime, contrary to the provisions of the trust agree-
ment." The lawyers who examined the title for those two grantees
may have relied upon the Rule in Shelley's Case, and they would
surely value its protection now.
FACTORS WHICH MIGHT PREVENT OPERATION OF RULE
There are, in this case of Johnson v. Shriver, several factors
which might appear to prevent the operation of the Rule.
The first such factor is that some of the property was Kansas
land. The descent of that land would of course be determined by
the law of Kansas, and therefore the limitation of a remainder to
"the heirs at law of said Ada Conroe, under the laws of descent
of the State of Colorado . . . " was not, as to the Kansas land, a
limitation to the heirs of Ada Conroe, as such, and so did not fall
within the Rule in Shelley's Case.
If the property had all been Colorado land (as almost all of
it was), the limitation would no doubt have been held to be to Ada
Conroe's heirs in the technical sense required by the Rule. What is
the effect of this situation in which the words mean "heirs" as
applied to Colorado land, but not as to Kansas land? No author-
ity has been found, but it would seem that in such a case the
inapplicability of the Rule to the Kansas land would not affect
its applicability to Colorado land.
Second, as another factor which might appear to exclude the
Rule, there is the spendthrift provision:
We direct that neither the income from said trust estate . . . nor
the principal fund or trust property shall be liable for her [Ada Con-
roe's] debts, past, present or future; nor shall said income or trust
property be subject to the right of any creditor of said beneficiary
to seize the same under any writ or by any proceeding at law or in
equity. And said beneficiary shall not have any power to give, grant,
sell, convey, mortgage, pledge, or otherwise dispose of, incumber, or
anticipate the income, or any installment thereof, it being our will
that no right of disposition of any such property shall vest in said ben-
eficiary, except by her will as herein provided.
This language is plain enough; and if the Rule in Shelley's Case
were a rule of construction it could not, in view of this provision
invest Ada Conroe with an alienable estate in fee simple. But the
Rule has never been a rule of construction, but a rule of law; and
spendthrift provisions should not prevent its operation.
3
OSIMES, THE LAW OF FUTURE INTERESTS, § 129, note 16 (1936). GRIS-
WOLD, SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS, § 277 (1947), cites cases both ways, but the two-
holdings that the rule is not applicable dealt with personalty to which the rule is not
applicable anyhow. Bennet v. Bennet, 217 I1. 434, 75 N.E. 339 '(1905), the first case
cited by Griswold, makes this distinction, "As applied to a devise of real estate, the
position of the appellant [that the Rule in Shelly's Case applies in spite of spendthrift
provisions] is sound .... As applied to gifts or conveyances of personalty the word
'heirs' strictly speaking has no application . . . and the Rule in Shelly's case . . . Is
held to yield to the express intention of the testator."
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Third, another factor which might seem to exclude the Rule,
is the provision by virtue of which the remainder given to the heirs
of Ada Conroe was subject to destruction by an executory limita-
tion-the exercise of a general testamentary power by Ada Conroe.
It is established, however, that the destructibility of the remainder
does not render the Rule in Shelley's Case inapplicable.
4
REQUIREMENT THAT BOTH ESTATES BE LEGAL OR EQUITABLE
There remains a fourth factor in this case which probably
does justify the exclusion of the Rule. However this conclusion
is not clear, and the problem seems to merit some discussion. The
Rule in Shelley's Case is applicable only to those situations in
which the estate of the ancestor and the remainder to his heirs are
both legal, and to those in which they are both equitable. In other
words, if one interest is legal and the other is equitable, the Rule
does not apply. In this case the remainder to the heirs of Ada
Conroe is plainly legal:
Upon the death said Ada Conroe, cestui que trust, the trust herein
created shall cease and determine, and when said trust is terminated,
the trust property ... shall immediately vest in and become the prop-
erty of the devisees and legatees named in the will of said Ada Con-
roe, or in the event that said Ada Conroe leaves no will, then said
property shall vest in the heirs at law of said Ada Conroe. ...
There is no duty imposed upon the trustees with respect to
this ultimate remainder-not even a duty to convey. In such a
case it is clear that the remainder is not equitable, but legal. There-
fore, the Rule would be applicable if the life estate of Ada Conroe
were legal; but not if the life estate were equitable. Which is it?
It was obviously intended to be equitable. The Agreement recites,
" . . . we hold the title to said . . . property, in trust for the said
Ada Conroe, for and during her natural life . . . " But the Statute
of Uses was enacted for the very purpose of defeating such inten-
tion. When the Statute is applicable, it converts what was intended
to be an equitable interest into a legal interest.
APPLICABILITY OF STATUTE OF USES
Is the Statute applicable? This is a fairly close question. The
property involved is a freehold interest in land, and there is no use
upon a use. This makes the question turn entirely upon whether
the trust is active or passive. If it is passive, the Statute of Uses
converts the life interest of Ada Conroe into a legal estate in
spite of the clear intention of the parties that the interest should
be equitable.
There were conferred upon Ada Conroe, "the beneficiary,"
powers which are usually exercised by a trustee:
4 SIMES, ibid at note 15.
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We hereby appoint said Ada Conroe, our agent to control and
manage said trust estate; to rent and receive the income therefrom;
to apply said income, primarily to the payment of interest upon the
incumbrances thereon, taxes and repairs; and to use the remainder
of said income for her personal support and benefit.
What is there left for "the trustees" to do? Nothing, unless
it be found in that paragraph which provides that,
If it shall become or appear advisable to said trustees, during the
period of said trusteeship, to sell or transfer any of said trust prop-
erty, the same shall only be done by deed of conveyance executed by
all of said trustees; and if any of said trustees shall die during the
life of said trust, the remaining trustees, or trustee shall continue
said trust.
The provisions of this paragraph may appear to be superfluous
because they merely state, in effect, that the trustees shall be
deemed to be joint tenants, and this common law rule has not
been affected by statute in Colorado. In this case, however, there
are other circumstances which the draftsman may have had in
mind, and which would amply justify the inclusion of this para-
graph.
The trust property consisted of ten tracts of land owned by
Emma M. Shriver as tenant in severalty; three tracts owned by
Clifford A. Conroe as tenant in severalty; and one tract owned by
Clifford A. Conroe and Richard H. Conroe as joint tenants. No
attempt was made expressly to convey the legal title to these tracts
to the trustees. The only instrument signed by the three owners
merely recited:
Now, therefore, these presents witness that we hereby jointly and
severally declare, that we hold the title to said above mentioned and
described property, in trust for the said Ada Conroe ...
It is to be noticed that this joint and several declaration did not
purport to be descriptive of the tenancy by which the trustees were
to hold. (There is of course no such thing as a joint and several
tenancy.)
Furthermore, the words, "we hold title to the said above men-
tioned and described property in trust . . . " do not say, " we jointly
hold title," and might well mean, "we each hold title to the said
property as above mentioned and described." This meaning would
refer back to that language in which the property was mentioned
and described as follows:
Whereas the undersigned Emma M. Sbriver is the owner of the
following described property; . . .
And whereas, Clifford A. Conroe is the owner of the following
described property; . . .
And whereas Clifford A. Conroe and Richard H. Conroe are joint
owners of the following described property.
It would appear, therefore, since there had been no transfer of
the legal title of any of these tracts, that they could be conveyed
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by the separate deeds of the respective legal owners, without any
participation by the other parties to the agreement.
It seems not unlikely, therefore, that the draftsman consid-
ered it proper to clarify this aspect of the transaction by the ex-
plicit provision that the sale "or transfer of any of said trust prop-
erty ... shall only be done by deed of conveyance executed by all of
said trustees ......
Furthermore, it seems doubtful that the words which intro-
duced this paragraph, "If it shall become or appear advisable to
said trustees, during the period of said trusteeship, to sell or trans-
fer . . . " were intended to be anything more than introductory.
The power to sell is not expressly conferred; it is assumed.
If the purpose had been to confer a power or to impose a duty
it would seem that some standard for the determination of advisabil-
ity would have been mentioned, such as, "in their own uncontrolled
discretion," or "for the best interests of the said Ada Conroe."
Nothing like that appears. Nor is there any provision as to what
should be done with the proceeds of such sale, whether they shall
be reinvested in land, whether they shall be reinvested in some
other way, or whether they shall be paid over to the beneficiary.
The absence of some such provision also suggests that the para-
graph was not included for the purpose of conferring a power or
imposing a duty. The inference would seem rather to be that the
power of the trustees to sell and transfer the legal title to their
own tracts of land was taken for granted, and that it was the
draftsman's intention merely to create by this paragraph legal
relationships like those which would have resulted from a convey-
ance of the land to the trustees in joint tenancy.
A Passive Trust?
In view of these considerations it might well have been found
that the attempted trust was passive, and that it was therefore
executed by the Statute of Uses. Two cases in which the beneficiary
was authorized to exercise powers comparable to those conferred
in this case upon Ada Conroe are Craig v. Kinsey 5 and City Na-
tional Bank and Trust Co. of Evanston v. Pearsons.6 In the former,
the trustees were given somewhat more power, and the trust was
not executed; in the latter, the trustees were given somewhat less
power, and the trust was executed.
If this trust was passive, then it was executed by the Statute
of Uses, in which case both the life estate of Ada Conroe and the
remainder to her heirs would be legal, and the Rule in Shelley's
Case would be applicable. The result would be that the remainder
which seemed to be limited to the heirs of Ada Conroe would be
vested in her in fee simple, and her life estate would merge in the
5370 11. 32, 18 N.E. 2d 895 (1938).
6307 I1. App. 548, 30 N.E. 2d 774 (1941).
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remainder, so that she would have a present legal estate in fee
simple in possession.
The foregoing argument finds some support in the conduct
of Ada Conroe. The order of the District Judge recites:
It is obvious that the testatrix [Ada Conroe] had erroneous ideas
as to what power she had under the trust agreement. In the first
paragraph of the will she directs that all of her just debts, except
those that are secured by liens be paid. This would indicate that
she thought she owned this property and was liable for the lien in-
debtedness thereon. And further, the abstract produced shows two
attempts by the testatrix to alienate parts of the trust property in
her lifetime, contrary to the provisions of the trust Agreement.
It is not known how far these "attempts" were carried, nor whether
the trustees acquiesced.
A Fee Simple With Appendant Power of Appointment?
If Ada Conroe did have a present legal estate in fee simple,
she could, as owner, convey it inter vivos or by will, or let it de-
scend to her heirs. Could she also have, appendant to the same
land, a power of appointment, as distinguished from a power to
convey? The Restatement of the Law of Property says that in the
United States no such power appendant can exist; but the ortho-
dox cases at common law do recognize such powers.
To summarize: if the trust were passive, and if the Rule in
Shelley's Case were in force in Colorado, and if the Restatement's
rule that powers appendant do not exist were the law of Colorado,
then of course the creditor of Ada Conroe could reach the property
because it was her own legal estate in fee simple.
7
But the decision is otherwise. Therefore it must be concluded
that the trust was active, or that the Rule in Shelley's Case is not
in force in Colorado, or that powers appendant do exist in Colo-
rado. None of these problems inherent in the case is mentioned
in the abstract of record, the briefs, or the opinion.
EXERCISE OF POWER OF APPOINTMENT BY PROVISION IN WILL
So much for the problems that were not mentioned in the
opinion. Many others were. One such problem, together with the
court's answer, was, in part, as follows :s
FIRST: Where a power of appointment was created, as herein-
above stated, will an exercise of that power in favor of creditors
result from a statement in the will of the donee of the power that all
the just debts of testatrix [donee] shall be paid?
The question is answered in the negative. . . .. There is no pre-
sumption that the direction to pay debts, contained in the will was
Another effect of the execution of the trust by the Statute of Uses would be to
render invalid the attempted restraints on alienation, even though the Rule in Shelley's
Case were not in force, because no provision is made for the termination of the life
estate upon attempted alienation. This question was of course moot because the life
tenant had died, but it is worth noting because the opinion assumes the validity of
these restraints.
8216 P. 2d 653, 656-657 (1950).
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in fact an exercise of the power of appointment possessed by testatrix.
An intention to execute the power must be affirmatively shown, and
that intention must be so clearly established that the transaction is
not fairly susceptible of any other interpretation.
In its consideration of this problem the court makes no refer-
ence to a fact which it had already mentioned in another connec-
tion, and which should have been decisive on this point, namely:
"the fact that there were no assets in the estate also stands ad-
mitted." Therefore, the first paragraph of the will could have no
effect whatsoever unless it were as the exercise of the power. In
such circumstances the case falls squarely within the proposition
above quoted from the opinion, " . . . that the transaction is not
fairly susceptible of any other interpretation."
This rule has been recognized in two other Colorado cases.
Barnard v. Moore, supra, which the court cites for another proposi-
tion in its discussion of this very point, contains this language:
It seems that a deed containing no reference to the power will
not be regarded as an exercise thereof, unlesc otherwise there would
be nothing for the conveyance to operate on.
The other Colorado case, Bennett v. Laws 9 is mentioned infra.
The three cases upon which the court relies in concluding
that the direction to pay debts did not exercise the power are all
distinguishable on this very point, because in none of them did it
appear, as it does here, "that there were no assets in the estate."
Those three cases contain this distinguishing language:
The will . . . makes no reference to the power or to the property
covered by it, and there is no evidence that it would be inoperative
without the aid of the power. There is no evidence of the kind, con-
dition, or value of the property, if any, owned by the testator.10 ...
Testatrix died possessed of an individual estate and also of an
estate over which she had power of appointment .... We agree with
the court below that there is nothing in the above-quoted portion of
the will or in other parts of it, to show any intention other than that
testatrix's individual estate." . . .
The principal question upon this appeal is whether there has
been a blending of the individual estate of testatrix with an estate
over which she had a power of appointment." . . .
One who reads the opinion in Johnson v. Shriver might be
justified in assuming that counsel for the creditor had overlooked
the decisive importance of the fact that there were no assets in
the estate. This assumption is supported by the court's statement
that, "Claimant does not here directly argue that the direction to
pay debts, standing alone, would show an exercise of the power of
appointment."
'59 Colo. 290, 149 P. 439 (1915).
,0 Emery v. Emery, 325 Il1. 212, 156 N.E. 364 (1927).
In Re Valentine's Estate, 297 Pa. 99, 146 At]. 453 (1929).
12In Re Stannert's Estate, 339 Pa. 439, 15 A. 2d 360 (1940).
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It is somewhat surprising, therefore, to find the following
language in the claimant's brief:
The first theory of the claimant is that Ada Conroe was exer-
cising her power to give the property described in the trust agree-
ment to anyone she might name in her will when in the first para-
graph of her will she directed the payment of all her just debts as
soon as convenient after her decease and intended that her creditors
should be and therefore are her first appointees. This theory is
strengthened by the consideration of the third paragraph of her will
in which only the residue of the estate of which she is seized or
possessed or which she is empowered to convey by will is conveyed
to her children named. Although the testatrix does not specifically
mention the power in this first paragraph, viewing the will as a
whole, considering the fact she had no other property, it is logical
to conclude that she intended to and did make her creditors her
appointees and that her debts should be satisfied before the appointees
named in the residuary clause should receive any part of her estate.
The claimant's position that it is unnecessary for the instrument
or a particular sentence or paragraph thereof to mention the power
in order to be construed to be an exercise of the power where it can-
not otherwise operate because of the fact that the donee had no prop-
erty upon which it could operate has been established as the rule in
Colorado in these words:
"It is thoroughly settled everywhere that, when the instrument
does not mention the power but could have no material operation ex-
cept as executing it, it shall be treated as intended to have that effect."
Bennett v. Laws, 59 Colo. 290, quoting from Reeves on Real Property,
Vol. 2, P. 1237.
The fact that the will was made December 2, 1946, less than six
months before she became deceased May 25, 1947, is another surround-
ing circumstance favorable to the position of claimant.
The case of Blake v. Hawkins, 98 U.S. 315, states that where a will
is made shortly before the death of the appointor, it may be presumed
that the financial condition of the appointor was the same as at the
time of death, and that the provisions of her will should be construed
upon the premise that the financial condition of the appointor was
the same at the time the will was made as at the time of her death. In
that case, the court held the testatrix was exercising her power of
appointment because she willed more property than she had without
considering the property which she had the power to convey.
It follows from the application of the above mentioned rules of
law to the undisputed facts that the donee of the power intended to
and did exercise the power given her in the trust agreement.
It is apparent that the claimant did argue the point, pertinently
and logically, and for two pages of the brief.
As further bearing on the intention of the testatrix to exer-
cise the power by directing that her debts be paid, it is worthwhile
to note that the district judge stated in his conclusions of law, "It
is the opinion of the Court that the testatrix treated all of this
property as her own and intended that her debts should be paid
therefrom. . . . " This would seem to have required a holding in
favor of the creditor, but the district court further concluded that:
It is the opinion of the court that the testatrix by this will made
no attempt to exercise the power of appointment contained in the
DICTA
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trust agreement and had no more right to dispose of this property as
her own than she had in the attempted conveyances she made in her
lifetime.
In other words, even though Ada Conroe could have appointed
the "trust property" to her creditors (or to her own estate, since
the power was general), she did not attempt to do so, but she
tried instead to treat the property as her own-an attempt which
the district judge held to be invalid as an effort to violate the
spendthrift provisions of the agreement.
The district judge's concluding statement on this point was,
The only relief she was warranted in extending to her creditors
under the provisions of the trust agreement was to make a specific
bequest to such of her creditors as she desired of such property as
she should select.
This language is quoted in the opinion of the Supreme Court and
is followed by the statement, "we are in accord with this view."
Insofar as this conclusion is based upon the spendthrift pro-
visions of the agreement, it is weakened by the--dubious validity
of the attempt to create a merely equitable life estate in Ada Con-
roe. But if the validity of the trust and of the spendthrift provi-
sions be assumed, then it is evident that the court is admitting
that those provisions do not preyent an effective exercise of the
power in favor of creditors-in 'fact the court shows just how it
should be done-in a way Which is not suggested by the terms of
the agreement.
What the court appears really to be saying is that the testatrix
could not treat the property over which she had a general testa-
mentary power as if it were her own estate. No authority for
such a proposition has been found other than one Maryland case
decided in 1888.13 The rule to the contrary is supported by abun-
dant authority.
14
With respect then, to the first question set forth in the opinion
it would appear that on the facts of this case the answer might
properly have been in the affirmative.
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS As AGAINST APPOINTEES
After having answered the first question in the negative, the
court next finds that the power was exercised by the second and
third paragraphs of the will, and then proceeds to consider the
third question:15
THIRD: In exercising the power of appointment by naming the
original donors of the power, in whom the legal title to the property
remained prior to the exercise of the power, did the donee appoint
mere "volunteers" and thereby give rise to rights in her creditors?
13 Balls v. Dampman, 69 Md. 390, 16 Atl. 16 (1888).
14 See cases collected in 93 A.L.R. 967.
15216 P. 2d 653, 658 (1950).
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This question, as stated, obviously begs the question as to
whether the rule in favor of creditors of the donee of a general
power is applicable only when the appointment is to volunteers,
and this same assumption is made in the court's answer :16
The rule for which claimant contends is stated as follows: . . .
If such a power . . . is exercised in favor of the one who pays no
consideration, "a volunteer," the property is thereby made assets in
equity for payments of the donee's debts. . . . Thus, even under
this rule the respondents must be shown to have the status of "volun-
teers" before the creditor claimant is entitled to the relief sought.
The court finds that the appointment was not to "volunteers",
and then concludes, "On claimant's own theory she accordingly
fails to bring the case within the rule for which she contends." This
statement of "the claimant's own theory" is more narrow than
that contained in the brief of the plaintiff in error, wherein claim-
ant argued:
The rule of law that the property covered by a general power of
appointment . . . is liable for the debts of the donee at her death ...
[applies] .. .where she appoints the property to volunteers and in
some instances to creditors.
. ..Where [as in this case] the power is to convey by will, the
limitation [of the rule to appointments] to "volunteers" does not
apply.
The point is that with respect to conveyances generally, and
regardless of powers of appointment, a debtor may prefer one
creditor to another by a conveyance inter vivos (subject of course
to avoidance by trustee in bankruptcy) ; but no such preference
can be effectuated by a will.
A further indication that the claimant did not concede that
her claim would be good only as against "volunteers," is found in
her statement of the case wherein she apparently placed her chief
reliance upon State Street Trust Co. v. KisselU.17 That statement
is in part as follows:
The court found that the appointees were creditors of the grand-
child at the time the will was made and at the time of his death
- . .and that the share of the grandchild should pass to all of the
donee's creditors, not by will but by the rule of law that: "Equity
seizes the property on its way from the donor to the appointees and
applies it to the satisfaction of the debts of the appointor."
Even if it were assumed that the rule in favor of creditors
applied only when the appointment was to volunteers, it was neces-
sary to determine whether the appointees in this case were volun-
teers. On this point the court's opinion is as follows:
We adopt the words of the learned trial judge, who said, in dis-
posing of this point: "In this case the rule is sought to be enforced
16 Ibid.
17 302 Mass. 328, 19 N.E. 2d 25 (1939).
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against the owners of the property, and under no stretch of the im-
agination can they be considered volunteers .. "
It may have been easier for the court to adopt these words of the
trial judge than to explain them, especially in view of the fact
that in the preceding paragraph of the opinion, the court gave
the ordinary meaning to "volunteer," namely, "one who pays no
consideration."
DOES PROPERTY BECOME EQUITABLE ASSETS FOR CREDITORS?
A fourth question was propounded and answered as follows:
FOURTH: In this jurisdiction is the rule to be adopted that,
where a general power of appointment is exercised by the donee in
favor of a volunteer the appointive property becomes assets in equity
for payment of the donee's debts?
. . . While an answer to this question is not essential to an
affirmance of the judgment, for the reasons already stated, the ques-
tion is presented by this record, and we deem it advisable to give
the answer for the guidance of counsel in determining possible future
action with relation to those who took property as volunteers under
the terms of the second paragraph of the will. Our considered opinion
is that the rule stated in the question should not be adopted in Colo-
rado. We believe that better reasoning is to be found in the cases
from jurisdictions which do not recognize the rule.
The court then cites several cases, each of which will be con-
sidered in the order in which it was cited by the Colorado court.
Rhode Island Hospital Trust Co. v. Anthony,"' is somewhat
weakened by this language:
If we were convinced of the soundness of the English doctrine,
there are circumstances surrounding this case which would cause us
to refuse to direct this complainant to turn over these trust estates to
the executor to be taken by him into a foreign jurisdiction there to
be administered. The respondent executor has not satisfied us that
the assets of the estate of Miss Beckwith upon a prudent administra-
tion are insufficient for the payment of her debts.
In Re Howald's Trust 19 is somewhat weakened by this lan-
guage:
The facts of the instant case are to be distinguished . . . in that
[the donee) after exercising the power of appointment, expressly pro-
vided: "This bequest is subject to all my just debts" . . . It is our
conclusion that the plaintiff trustee . . . should pay to the executor
an amount sufficient to comply with this provision of the will. . . .
It therefore follows that so much of the appointed property as is
required for the payment of debts will be paid by the plaintiff trustee
to the executor and thereafter it comes a part of her estate.
Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. McCaughn 20 involved the
construction of section 402 (e) of the Revenue Act of 1919. The
court said:
"49 R. I. 339, 142 Atil. 531 (1928).
" 65 Ohio App. 191, 29 N. E. 2d 575 (1940).
34 F. 2d 600 (1929).
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The Congress thus had the power to tax any transmission of prop-
erty affected by death even though by the law of the descendent's
domicile such property was not part of his estate . . . therefore con-
clude that the property passing under the exercise of Mrs. Cole's
power of appointment was "property passing under a general power
of appointment," within the meaning of the Revenue Law.
The rule in favor of creditors was mentioned in discussing the
history of the Revenue Act, but was held not to be material in
this case.
Balls v. Damipman 21 is a square decision against the creditor,
and explains the general theory of powers, but does not deal with
the rule in favor of creditors.
Cutting v. Cutting 22 contains this distinguishing language,
We think too that it is clearly indicated in the revisers' notes to
the Revised Statutes . . . that it was then conceded that he English
rule [in favor of creditors] was the law of this state at that time. And
we need not now go farther in that inquiry, for we have come to a
conclusion . . . that the English rule has been abrogated by our
Legislature.
Boyle v. Smyth Co.23 is commented upon in 97 A.L.R. at 1072
as follows:
In Boyle v. John M Smyth Co.... the court said that while that
doctrine (in favor of creditors) expressed the general rule in Eng-
land, which had been followed by courts of high authority in this
country, the doctrine had been severely criticized, and, in so far as
the briefs disclosed, it had never been approved by the courts in
Illinois. Attention is, however, called to the Illinois cases on page
1514 of the earlier annotation (59 A.L.R. 1510) recognizing the Eng-
lish doctrine. It further appears that the question did not arise on
the facts, as there were no creditors.
St. Matthews Bank v. De Charette 24 is also somewhat weak-
ened by this language,
The English doctrine was embodied in our statutory law at that
time . . . the statute was enacted in 1796 and is to be found in Lit-
tell's Laws, page 597 . . . moreover, may it not be said, well and
logically, paralleling the line of thought of the New York court in
Cutting v. Cutting, supra, that since our Kentucky statute was subse-
quently repealed, it was the intent of the Legislature that he doc-
rine itself should be abrogated . . . ?
One more question: What should become of those two lots
in Wichita, Kansas?
T. G. M.
-69 Md. 390, 16 AtU. 16 (1888).
86 N. Y. 522 (1881).
23248 Ill. App. 57 (1928).
24 259 Ky. 802, 83 S.W. 2d 471 (1935).
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GRADUATE LAW DRAFTEES MAY BE ADMITTED
WITHOUT BAR EXAMINATION
On October 23, 1950, the Supreme Court of Colorado adopted
the following new rule, numbered Rule 220A:
"Until further order of Court, any bona fide resident of the
State of Colorado who has successfully completed the law course in
an accredited law school and obtained a degree therefrom, but who
is prevented from taking the next succeeding Bar Examination by
reason of being recalled to or drafted into the military service of
the United States prior to the date of such Bar Examination, may,
upon satisfactory proof of these conditions, be immediately licensed
as an attorney and counselor at law; provided his application re-
ceives a favorable report from the Bar Committee. Proof of his
educational and military status shall be made to the Chairman of
the Law Committee and by him certified to the Clerk of this Court;
provided further that any such applicant who has previously failed
in two examinations for admission to the Bar, irrespective of the
State or jurisdiction ifi which said examinations were taken, may
not be admitted under this rule."
TO MEMBERS OF THE BAR
Remodelling of the Supreme Court Library is expected
to begin within the next two or three weeks and will require
a month to six weeks to complete. An effort will be made to
keep the library in operation for the use of members of the
bar, notwithstanding the inconvenience, noise and confusion
necessarily attendant during construction.
FLOYD F. MILES, Librarian.
BOOK NOTICE
Review of FUTURE INTERESTS IN COLORADO by Edward C.
King.1 Dubuque: Win. C. Brown Company, Publishers. 1950.
Pp. 116. $3.50.
"Future Interests in Colorado!" The very title of this book
will shock all those Colorado lawyers who have from time to time
so confidently declared that they have never had any future inter-
ests problems in their offices. Dean King has found more than
fifty such cases in the Colorado reports.
Many lawyers had been aware of the existence of future in-
terests cases in Eighteenth Century England and in Nineteenth
Century Massachusetts because they were included in the stand-
ard law school casebooks on the subject, but it was generally be-
Dean, School of Law, University of Colorado.
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lieved that our forefathers had protected us from such evils in
Colorado by adopting only that part of the common law of England
which was suited to the genius of our people.
Dean King was well aware of this happy state of mind. He
writes, "Probably the very inability of lawyers to recognize some
of these (future interests) questions is a blessing in disguise. If,
through oversight, errors are made in the drafting of instruments,
it is not unlikely that there will be similar oversights when the
time comes for construction of the instruments; and lawyer and
client will live and die in blissful ignorance that a supposed right
or title was no right or title at all" (p. 3).
So far so good, but then comes this statement upon which the
justification of the book is based and for which no authority is
cited, "No lawyer, however, wishes to build his reputation upon
such an insecure foundation as reliance upon the mistakes of his
brethren in the profession" (p. 3).
In other words, the book is written in answer to a dire need
which has not yet been felt. A book with such a purpose must
necessarily partake of the nature of a missionary endeavor. It
must reveal hitherto unsuspected shortcomings; it must impart
zeal for a better way of life; and it must point the way. All of
these things Dean King does.
He writes modestly and with deference, but he does not hesi-
tate to point his finger at the mistakes of those in high places.
For example, "It is the writer's opinion, however, based on his
own experience and lack of knowledge concerning these (execu-
tory) interests, that a misconception regarding their validity has
been and is common among members of the bar. This is illustrated
by an occurrence which took place at the 1948 meeting of the
American Bar Association in Seattle. In the section on Real Prop-
erty, Probate Law and Trusts, a report was made by a committee
on uniform forms for wills. As I recall, a suggested form con-
tained a provision substantially to the effect that the widow should
take if she should survive the testator by 30 days. Objection was
immediately made from the floor that such a gift to the widow
would not be good. 'Where,' it was asked, 'will the title be during
the 30 days?' There seemed to be a quite general opinion that
such future estate could not be created except through the medium
of a trust. The gift would be good, of course, as an executory
devise" (p. 84).
Another example: "The Supreme Court (of Colorado) held
that the life estate in Harriet with power to alienate gave her a
fee simple absolute.
"While this ruling of the court may have been dictum, it was
made after considerable discussion and citation of authorities.
The court distinguished Blatt v. Blatt but did not mention Barnard
v. Moore, in which there was a flat holding that a limitation of a
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life estate, with power to alienate in the life tenant, does not give
the life tenant a fee simple absolute.
"The court's dictum in this McLaughlin case is contrary to
the great weight of authority in the United States, and poses a
serious problem in the examination of titles to real property in
Colorado" (pp. 72-73).
The two examples which have been quoted are typical of the
way in which Dean King discloses sins of commission and of omis-
sion at the bar and on the bench.
The book begins with an exhortation: "More than a hundred
years ago Lord Chancellor Hardwicke said that there was hardly
any estate of consequence without a trust. He might have added,
with equal truth, that there was hardly a trust without a prob-
lem of future interests. Today, with the importance and number
of trusts increased almost beyond calculation, Lord Hardwicke's
dictum may be repeated with even greater conviction than was
possible in his time, and we may also say that almost every trust,
every family settlement, every estate, every will of any conse-
quence, involves some question of future interests. Moreover,
almost every deed which restricts the use of land, or which creates
a terminable estate of any kind, raises a future interests problem.
"If this be true-if future interests do assume this importance
in modern law-it would seem that no lawyer should attempt to
draft any but the simplest deed, or any trust instrument, or any
will in which disposition of property is postponed beyond the
earliest possible distribution date, unless he is reasonably familiar
with the law of future interests" (p. 1).
Dean King sums up the problem which he has thus created
in these words, "Is there any way in which the average practicing
lawyer can obtain the insight, the clue, the tip-off--one might even
say the clairvoyance-that leads to expert draftsmanship or to
real advocacy in cases involving future interest?" (p. 3).
To this question he responds, "The answer, if there be an
answer, is to be found in simplification. It seems possible that the
most common future interests problems might be classified and
distinguished in such way as to make them fairly understandable,
the general rules as to each problem stated, and the case and statu-
tory law of a particular state such as Colorado compared with
the general rules in such a way as to give the practicing attorney
a manual of some practical use. That is the general purpose of
this book" (pp. 3-4).
A chapter is devoted to each of the following subjects: rever-
sions (nine pages), possibilities of reverter (eleven pages), rights
of entry for condition broken (eighteen pages), remainders (thir-
ty-seven pages), executory interests (nine pages), the rule against
perpetuities (twenty-one pages), powers and miscellaneous (three
pages). It is obvious from this listing that the chapter on powers
is much too short, and this defect becomes still more disappoint-
ing when it is discovered that the chapter deals only with the
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Nicholson case, 2 which involved the power to terminate a trust,
but had nothing to do with powers of appointment. The fact that
such powers need to be more fully understood by Colorado law-
yers is manifested by Johnson v. Shriver.3
The organization of all the other chapters follows closely a
well defined pattern: (1) definition of the interest, (2) hypotheti-
cal examples and comparisons with similar interest, (3) the Colo-
rado cases, (4) practical illustrations of mistakes to be avoided,
(5) a brief summary of matters to be borne in mind when dealing
with the interest.
Many of the points included in subdivisions (4) and (5) are
made with heartfelt emphasis, and some are even put in the sec-
ond person. For example, "Be consistent. Don't describe the
children of John in one place as 'his issue.' in another place as
'his lawful issue' and in another place as 'his heirs.' Find the
properly descriptive term and stick to it" (p. 78).
Subdivisions (1) and (2) are for the most part orthodox,
with chief reliance placed upon the Restatement, Leach, and Simes.
In a book of this size there have of course been instances of over-
simplification and attention should be called to the author's words,
"The reader is warned, however, that what here follows is in-
tended only for ready reference and as a suggestion of the prob-
lems that may be involved in the everyday work of examining
abstracts, and of drafting and construing deeds, wills, and direct
agreements. Once the problem is spotted, the attorney should form
his own opinion as to the law by direct reference to the Colorado
cases or to some one or more of the fine articles and texts on future
interests. If this (book) puts you upon notice that in a given
situation a problem exists, it will have served its purpose. It makes
no pretense to technical perfection" (p. 4).
In the chapter on reversions, for example, no reference is
made to the freehold subject to a term, nor to the problem of Eger-
ton v. Massey.4 The rule stated in Pibus v. Mitford,5 that "a man
cannot either by conveyance at the common law, by limitation of
uses, or devise, make his right heir a purchaser," is confused with
and -miscalled the doctrine of worthier title (which applies only
to wills and does not require the use of the word "heirs") ; and
a fee simple appears to be defined as "an estate which may last
forever" (p. 8). This failure to consider the possibility of a spring-
ing use limited upon the happening of an event certain to occur
is closely related to the error which Dean King observed at the
Seattle meeting of the American Bar Association.
Similar instances of oversimplification are to be found in
every chapter, but only one other will be mentioned. That is the
definition "for Colorado purposes" of an executory interest (p.
81), which does not include the interest limited to a third person
2104 Colo. 561, 93 P. 2d 880 (1939).
3- Colo. -, 216 P. 2d 653 (1950).
4 3 C.B. (N.S.) 338, 140 Eng. Rep. 771 (1857).
5 1 Vent. 372. 86 Eng. Rep. 239 (1674).
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following a freehold in a term. Shades of the Duke of Norfolk!6
Subdivision (3) of each chapter deals with the Colorado cases
in a way which may be well surmised from the language with
which the book ends: "If the writer has seemed at times over
critical of our courts, it has been in the interests of accuracy and
consistency, and never from any disrespect for those courts or for
the high-minded gentlemen who have graced our appellate benches"
(p. 113).
As a matter of fact, the author criticizes, either as to the
result or as to the analysis, or both, about a third of all the Colo-
rado cases cited, and this takes into account many which were
merely named without any comment.
It seems fair to conclude that Colorado lawyers were wrong
when they asserted that they had no future interests problems, but
that their apparent blindness was merely the external manifesta-
tion of sensitive defense mechanisms.
Dean King's book should mark the beginning of a new era.
Every Colorado lawyer should read it from cover to cover annually
(in connection perhaps, with the yearly physical check-up and for
a similar purpose), and all Colorado decisions prior to the pub-
lication of this book should be revalued in its light.
T. G. M.
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